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ABSTRACT
This article assesses the relevance of US seapower in the contemporary
security environment. This paper builds upon a rich literature on sea
power, strategy, and maritime operations to assess recent factors and
emerging geostrategic dynamics that are likely to affect American maritime
strategy, while keeping sight of the principles that will endure regardless
of shifting domestic and international politics. It places the application of
sea power in an historic and strategic context to inform the policy choices
that confront the administration in wielding elements of national power to
further U.S. interests around the world. These issues come to the fore as
the Trump Administration is seeking to expand the size of the Navy, with
various proposals to increase the number of ships in the fleet to 350 ves-
sels. The article presents these issues to highlight the building blocks avail-
able and the challenges faced by the United States as it seeks to
reinvigorate its maritime strategy in the 21st century.
This article addresses the relevance and value of U.S. sea power in the 21st century as the Donald
J. Trump administration enters its third year in office.1 It builds upon a rich literature on sea
power, strategy, and maritime operations to assess recent factors and emerging geostrategic
dynamics that are likely to affect American maritime strategy, while keeping sight of the
principles that will endure regardless of shifting domestic and international politics. It places the
application of sea power in an historic and strategic context to inform the policy choices that
confront the administration in wielding elements of national power to protect the United States
and to further U.S. interests around the world. The Trump administration is considering a
significant expansion of the Navy.2 It is important that strategic considerations drive the evolu-
tion of the Navy’s force structure to reflect the principles of maritime strategy—principles that
have been a constant of America’s national security strategy over the last century.3 Yet, sea power
should not be seen as has been traditionally the case as a zero-sum argument argument against
the other two military departments. It should be defined and argued as an element of symbiosis
producing world-class military power, thereby making it very much in the other military
departments interests to see as supremely world-class.
The potential expansion of the Navy also occurs as the United States is attempting to reduce
its direct involvement in the long-running wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. One result of America’s
experience over the last 15 years in these irregular wars is a new reluctance to send significant
land forces abroad. While the United States may not go so far as to return to a global approach
of “offshore balancing” that would see American forces withdrawn from various geographic thea-
ters, we are almost certainly entering an era where the United States will seek to exert indirect
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influence around the world principally through sea power and airpower.4 The Navy finds itself
alone among the services in that most of its forces remain continuously deployed around the
world. As Peter Swartz notes, “Centuries of constant national direction to the Navy to be ready
to conduct global deployments, combat operations, diplomatic visits and engagement with
foreign armed services has driven intense schedules of at-sea exercises, training evolution, and
experiments across the whole gamut of naval missions and activities.”5 Even in peacetime, the
Navy is forward deployed and constantly honing its tactical and operational mastery of the
battle space.
This paper highlights the conceptual building blocks of sea power and maritime strategy and
its implementation by maritime forces, within the context of a joint force. The first section
describes the roots of American maritime strategy and naval power. The following section
summarizes the strategic issues that faced the Navy during the post-Cold War period. The final
section identifies contemporary geostrategic challenges confronting the U.S. armed forces in the
Baltic, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and East and South China Seas and how sea power can
contribute to the joint effort of pursuing U.S. national interests.
What’s past is prologue
The ability and capacity of the United States to fight and win its wars abroad as opposed to
having to fight on its own territory has rested with maritime forces. In the second half of the
20th century, America’s maritime power has been buttressed by its alliances as well as the evolu-
tion of its own joint forces. To be sure, the process of service unification has not always been
smooth, but there is little doubt that the United States today wields a joint force and with its
allies, a combined military like no other in the world. The U.S. Navy acts as the key enabler of
this joint, interagency, and combined force because it remains on constant patrol and is always at
the ready to respond to crises typically as part of the joint force.
Americans today have become accustomed to the idea that U.S. military power has unimpeded
access to all corners of globe as if such a fact were an eternal right. In reality, this capability
derives from the freedom of the seas that is assured by naval power. While the ability to project
power in the air, land, and digital domains are significant, the sine qua non of U.S. strategy is sea
power on a global scale. Regardless of where and how U.S. policymakers decide to intervene to
protect U.S. interests, the Navy will be responsible for gaining access to the region and protecting
the lines of communication with the support of land and air forces and allies. At critical
moments, sea power provided by the U.S. Navy is the very foundation of a joint response to
crises and looming threats.
For much of America’s history, the U.S. Navy not only has been the first line of defense, but
also the leading means of strategic offense as ships increased in range and their weapons
increased in lethality. This offensive role has become particularly pronounced since the modern
U.S. Navy emerged in the late 19th century. In the age of the Monroe Doctrine and continental
expansion, the U.S. Navy was assigned a defensive role as part of a system of coastal defense.
With the advent of the steel navy in the 1880s, however, this posture took on a blue water focus
as America rose to become a world power. By the 1890s, the primacy of the defensive was
abandoned in favor of the imperative of the offensive in order to inflict decisive harm on the
nation’s enemies, which were to be met outside of the Western Hemisphere in Europe and Asia.
Alfred Thayer Mahan codified this global imperative in his book The Influence of Sea Power
on History,6 the importance of which has been revived with the specter of contemporary geopolit-
ical upheaval and confrontation in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The need to reach across
the seas to shape outcomes at a distance remains possible only through a blue-water navy. The
Navy retains its strategic importance to U.S. policy because of the distance from North America
to various parts of the world. While the digital age might appear to make this distance irrelevant,
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as the air and space age did before it, the factor of physical distance painfully reasserts itself
when the United States must apply and support military power in a crisis. This challenge would
become immediately apparent if a hostile navy emerged that could prevent the movement of joint
and allied forces and commerce—something that has not happened in the living memory of most
Americans.7 U.S. air and land forces would suffer disproportionally if the Navy were not capable
of supporting their deployment and sustainment. The contestation of the South China Sea and
the debate over freedom of navigation operations8 illustrates this fundamental insight for a gener-
ation that has lost sight of geography and naval power in the “digital” age.9
Navies can be used either in the role of defense or offense. The U.S. Navy denies the world’s
oceans to America’s enemies, while guaranteeing freedom of navigation to allies and friends. This
command of the sea permits the free movement of commerce and the swift deployment of joint
forces. The U.S. Navy also must contribute to the joint defense of the continental United States
and allied littorals, while at the same conducting offensive operations on a global front when
necessary. Furthermore, the Navy improves alliance cohesion and facilitates burden-sharing when
it comes to global security and defense.
War at sea differs from war on land in the realm of objectives and especially in the uniqueness
of the domain in which such war is waged—the world’s seas. Hence, the strategy of land combat
has only limited application to war at sea. The reason for this is that naval forces generally have
more limited strategic goals than land and air forces. Naval forces are essential complements to
supporting and sustaining land and air operations, as the latter two are often fated to wrest the
final decision in conflict. Given the importance of sealift in support of army operations of any
consequence, naval, land, and air forces should be properly seen as needing to constitute strategic
symbiosis in order which is needed to win conflicts. In other cases, naval forces provide direct
combat power to deter or coerce an adversary. Warships are unique features of sea power, with
their capacity for operations over extraordinary distance, their relative autonomy in the tactical
dimension, their destructive power, and their high cost. Because of their very nature, warships
possess mobility and a tactical and strategic independence that battlefield weapons—e.g., armored
fighting vehicles or armor brigades—do not possess. The U.S. Navy can compensate for modest
mistakes in strategic or tactical foresight because it can quickly sail to the scene of a regional
crisis to demonstrate American resolve, or take rapid action to complicate the plans of state and
non-state actors seeking to present Washington with a fait accompli.
The world’s oceans comprise the realm where maritime forces confront one another in
conflict. Sea power assures the transfer across the world’s oceans of combined and joint forces
and materiel to be used against enemy units. Sea power enables the transfer of resources, com-
merce and materiel of maritime trade, especially those strategic materials necessary for national
survival and power. Sea power prevents an enemy from deploying and supporting his own armies
and thus can offer a shield against invasion and conquest in many—though not all—regions.
Maritime forces in the offensive posture make essential contributions to the tactical,
operational and strategic outcome of air and land combat far from the water’s edge. In support
of land operations, or acting alone, navies can damage coastal trade and constrain land transpor-
tation. Furthermore, sea power contributes to joint fires through providing mobile artillery,
precision-strike missiles against land targets, and mobile air bases that can support army-led land
operations. Economically, sea power can place pressure on an adversary by preventing the import
of scarce commodities and war materiel. It may halt the opponent’s commerce, which is essential
for maintaining a nation’s economy and its capacity to wage war. Damaging trade may also lead
to social unrest that may put further pressure on an opponent and scatter his attention, all in
support of winning the campaign on land.
Sea power’s offensive role and providing critical support to land campaigns, cannot be taken
for granted any longer because emerging adversaries have significant ground-based defensive
power of ever-increasing range and lethality—a constraint that has not been a concern since the
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latter part of the Cold War. As an old maxim of war at sea instructs, important warships cannot
be risked against land fortifications and coastal batteries where enemy air forces are intact and an
enemy fleet in being may pose a threat. The old truth that a gun on land generally defeats a
gun at sea still obtains today. The prospect of Russian and Chinese fortifications in such places as
the Kaliningrad oblast, Crimea, the islands in the South China Sea, or the littoral waters of the
Chinese mainland armed with precision-guided anti-surface and anti-air missiles is thus a cause
for concern. The role of these ground-based long-range weapons is to threaten the unimpeded
operations of U.S. maritime forces. In earlier times, navies at war always had to reckon with
forms of coastal defense in various modes, and the fact that this feature of war has reasserted
itself merely reflects the need to reconsider the fighting principles of the U.S. Navy, which in the
end need to provide essential support to land force commanders.
Much of the debate about peacetime sea power concerns its tools—that is, the number and
character of its ships, aircraft, submarines, projectiles, unmanned vehicles, and satellites. The ideal
warship is the least expensive one that can carry out its strategic role while maintaining a degree
of tactical independence in modest threat environments. Here the debate hinges on whether a
larger number of light ships or the smaller number of heavy ones is preferable; this theme has
dominated naval politics, policy and strategy for centuries.10 By contrast, issues involving
personnel generally rise to the forefront in moments of crisis when it becomes apparent that key
recruitment, training, education, or retention policies are not fit for purpose. Despite the focus
on hardware, just like its sister services, human capital is the Navy’s most critical asset. However
what sets it aside from the army and air force is that that fewer people are willing or able to
sacrifice the comforts of land for the rigors of a life at sea. The U.S. Navy has lately witnessed
a shrinking number of heavy ships and a steady increase in the number of small ones, a classic
issue that goes to the very birth of the U.S. Navy. The forces of economy, budget, strategy, and
tactics traditionally dominate debates about small ships versus capital ships, the results of which
have direct consequences for the navy to be able to support land operations. Today this debate is
further complicated by the rapid pace of technological change brought about by the impact of
Moore’s law on military technology. A host of new technologies—artificial intelligence, cyber
operations, autonomous vehicles, and additive manufacturing, among others—could conceivably
undermine or alter the role of warships in a modern navy. A fleet must be balanced so that it
can undertake diplomacy and reassurance operations, littoral warfare, naval control and protec-
tion of shipping, power projection, and strike aviation in support of land campaigns undertaken
in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy has focused on this previous
mission set for so long that it has lost sight of the reality of war at sea and the principles of
sea power as they are reasserting themselves in Eurasia even as a host of new technologies are
emerging that could quickly revolutionize combat in the maritime domain.11
21st century maritime strategy and sea power
The end of the Cold War saw the U.S. Navy continually deployed around the world performing a
diverse array of flexible missions. Today, the Navy performs such vital tasks as strategic nuclear
deterrence, ballistic missile defense, humanitarian and disaster relief operations, patrol of critical
sea lines of communications and trade, freedom of navigation demonstrations, and strike and
indirect fire support for littoral and land operations wherever necessary. The Navy has boiled
down these different tasks into five functions, essential components of the joint force: all domain
access, deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security.12 Peter Swartz states a
similar idea in a more colorful way, “the U.S. Navy is a ‘full-service Navy.’”13 The Navy has also
contributed to the construction of a network of global maritime relationships with allied and
partner navies around the world, which has made a significant contribution to the U.S. national
interest as well as global security and stability. Today, the world’s navies cooperatively police the
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world’s oceans—a domain that is today almost completely free of sustained political violence. The
systemic breakdown of order within states bordering the littorals has thus far not manifested itself
at sea on a wide scale. The U.S. Navy deserves significant credit for this achievement through the
formal and informal maritime cooperation structures it has developed in locales ranging from
the Bab el Mandab to the Straits of Malacca to the Gulf of Guinea to the Strait of Hormuz.
Furthermore, the Navy has been instrumental in developing and supporting the wide array of
anti-piracy and smuggling task forces off the Horn of Africa and Somalia. Without any doubt,
the U.S. Navy is the glue for this vast and unprecedented system of global maritime security.
So far in the post-World War II era, no developed state has deemed it in their interests to dis-
rupt the world’s ocean waterways and trade routes. The free movement of goods and services on
the world’s oceans is the lifeblood of the global economy and is essential to the prosperity of the
states that participate in it. Over 90 percent of global trade moves across the world’s oceans, and
it is unlikely that any other transportation medium will emerge to replace ocean-going trade. In
the post-World War II era, developed states have faced a basic contradiction: disrupting global
trade at sea would threaten their own survival. The benefits of the orderly and peaceful function-
ing of global markets far outweigh the costs entailed in disrupting those markets. The greatest
threat to the peaceful functioning of the world’s seaborne trade system would come from a
developed state’s belief that the benefits of defection from this system outweighed the benefits of
continued cooperation; the historical example of Japan in 1941 presents one possible outcome if
a state came to believe that military intervention was necessary to preserve its access to markets
and resources because of great power tension and conflict.14 Nevertheless, the current movements
seeking to rebalance exposure to the forces of globalization are unlikely to fundamentally restruc-
ture these trade flows. Whilst Britain may have voted to leave the European Union, it evinces no
interest in withdrawing from global commerce and adopting autarkic economic policies. Indeed,
the most impassioned issue in this nativist trend centers on the challenges of immigration, with
only minor implications for the importance of the maritime sphere.
Connected to this basic calculus is the difficulty that any state actor would face in disrupting
this vast global system. Nevertheless, there are a few critical chokepoints (e.g., Bab el Mandab,
Strait of Hormuz, Straits of Malacca) and economically vital nodes (e.g., the Ras Tanura oil
export complex as well as crucial container transit ports such as Shanghai, Hong Kong, Dubai,
etc.) where sustained disruption would produce significant shocks to the global economy. Only
the U.S. Navy is capable of producing this type of disruption because it has the force structure to
intervene in the world’s trading system on a systemic basis. It would be unthinkable, however,
for the United States to use its Navy in this way. No state in the international system has been
more committed to the orderly and functioning of global markets than the United States. Indeed,
a principal purpose of the U.S. Navy has been to preserve the orderly functioning of global
markets.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Navy provided key support to army-commanded
campaigns of irregular wars on land that grew out of the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. In
these wars, it served its traditional strategic role of instrumentalizing land power, making it
possible keep ground forces in the field via support from the sea. The Navy also directly
supported land forces with naval aviation and other strike forces along with thousands of naval
personnel that served with the land forces as augmentees. Carrier strike groups provided direct
tactical support to the land forces on a nearly-continuous basis. Navy strike groups today remain
involved in strike operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its affiliates
across the wider Middle East and Africa.
The post-9/11 era finds the United States confronting a complex set of crises around the
world. The United States has not faced a more diverse and complex array of security challenges
since the end of World War II. In testimony presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee
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in 2016, James Clapper, then-Director of National Intelligence, identified a range of new threats
in the international system, including:15
! Cyber and information warfare is now practiced by both state and non-state actors. Russia’s
cyber-attack on the United States during the 2016 election represented only the latest
innovation in terms of using the digital domain as an instrument of state power and influence.
Russia is now prosecuting similar attacks in Europe.
! Terrorism is now a common weapon of non-state actors like ISIS, which has mounted or
inspired attacks around the globe.
! Transnational and even global criminal corporate networks have emerged whose wealth and
power rival that of some states.
! Rapid improvements in artificial intelligence that can be applied to nefarious activities portend
threats that will be difficult to predict or imagine.
! The proliferation of long-range missiles provides actors with the ability to strike adversaries
with great accuracy at increasing ranges. This development is almost certainly altering the
offense-defense balance between shore- and sea-based weapon systems. Long range, accurate
indirect fire weapons offer states the ability to target naval forces hundreds of miles away,
thus complicating the ability of naval forces to operate close to shore.
! Unmanned systems have diffused to state and non-state actors and have eroded advantages
the United Sates has held for decades in remote strike and ISR.16
! Over half of the world’s 178 states are exhibiting characteristics of state failure.17
! Refugee migrations stemming from state failure and wars in the developing world are
straining the ability of international, national, and non-governmental organizations
to respond.
Another defining feature of the last decade is the return of great power rivalry as source of
friction in the international system. This rivalry is indelibly shaped by the world’s geography—a
fact that speaks to the importance of the U.S. Navy in this moment of geopolitical shift.
Significant geopolitical challenges in the international system include:
! Russian armed forces modernization and demonstration of its hostile intentions towards the
West, first in Georgia (2008) and then Ukraine through the illegal annexation of Crimea
(2014) and supporting separatists in its eastern oblasts (2014-present), and Syria (2016-
present). Russia has also violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by
developing and testing new types of intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
! China’s return to great power status and attendant assertion of its ascendance over states in
Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia. China views maritime power as a useful tool as it seeks
to influence its neighbors and advance its interests. A wide variety of maritime disputes are
now ongoing in the Western Pacific.
! The Middle East has imploded, reordering regional politics and straining America’s partner-
ships across the region. The Middle East is characterized by:
" State failure and ongoing civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya;
" A refugee crisis of unprecedented proportions that threatens the political stability of
Europe and the Western alliance;
" Frayed Cold War-era political relationships between the United States and Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, and especially Turkey;
" An unstable regional balance of power in which Iran and Iraq along with their surrogates
are facing off against Saudi Arabia, the Sunni Arab states, and Israel;
" In the absence of a continued peace process, the increasing likelihood of violence and
instability gripping Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and their neighboring states; and
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" The Syrian civil war has seen the return of Russian influence to the Middle East.
! Western European states drastically reduced the size and capabilities of their armed forces in
the wake of the Cold War in anticipation of a peace dividend. Recent actions in Eastern
Europe have led them to choose rearmament to answer to Russia’s threats against NATO
states from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
Sea power in regional contingencies
The Russian challenge
Since the 2014 Russian coup de main in Crimea and its support for a low-intensity conflict in
eastern Ukraine, provocative military actions in the Baltic Sea and its attempts to intimidate the
trio of new NATO allies; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have loomed into focus as the decisive
point of U.S. strategic interest in Europe. Since the Crimean operation, these three nations have
been depicted as the likely next targets of Russia’s grand strategic plan to unseat the European
order of the 1990s via coercive diplomacy, psychological warfare, and the limited use of irregular
armed forces. The threat of nuclear and conventional armed forces, on a scale unseen since the
1980s, is again tangible on the European landmass. NATO has responded to Russian revisionism
of the European order by reviving its strategy and forces for the continental defense of Europe.
These developments have raised questions about the U.S. Navy’s response to Russian revanchist
behavior in Europe and its capabilities to conduct operations along Europe’s littorals, as well as
support Army-led land operations.
The Baltic Sea
Since the Crimean annexation, the debate about maritime strategy and the fate of the Baltic states
has overlooked the strategic reality that the key to the Baltics is the violent ebb and flow of
empires in the Nordic-Baltic region. To understand the challenges posed by this region, Navy
strategists must determine whether this process has been revived by the increase in Russian power
since 2008.
The Baltic Sea as a theater of naval conflict presents a high challenging environment in which
to conduct operations.18 Maritime activity in the Baltic is difficult even in peacetime because of
numerous navigational hazards as well as frequent violent weather. Capital ships and submarines
are constantly confronted with shallow seas and obstructions of all kinds. Small vessels, which are
central to naval operations there, face constant challenges of wind and weather, as well as ice in
wintertime. Wind, fog, and ice lock in major ports for almost half the year. Naval mines, which
first appeared in the Baltic, are the ideal weapon of defense in this area because of the shallow
water. This littoral is also the ideal home to small submarines, as Swedish headlines in the wake
of the Crimean operation recall, even as the variable salinity and unique character of the Baltic
Sea make anti-submarine operations problematic.
During the Cold War, the Baltic Sea became one of the theaters of NATO defense against the
Warsaw Pact. The Baltic allowed NATO to concentrate significant forces against the border
between the NATO central front and its northern flank. The Baltic also constituted one avenue
through which Soviet and Warsaw Pact power could be arrayed against the Scandinavian-Nordic
realm; this power had the potential to threaten the West’s command of the North Atlantic,
particularly the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. Similarly, in the minds of Soviet and
Warsaw Pact strategic and operational planners, the Baltic and Scandinavian theater served as a
potential pathway for a dagger thrust into the strategic core of the Warsaw Pact. Today, the Baltic
poses a similar problem for Russian planners—they must always consider the possibility that
the U.S. Navy and NATO allies could serve as a rapid response force to any Russian blow against
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NATO’s eastern flank. Navy airpower poses a constant threat because it can strike deeply into the
Russian strategic, continental core, as well as support Army-commanded land operations.19
The eastern Mediterranean
The United States Navy’s commitment to patrolling the Mediterranean Sea has waxed and waned
over the years. At the close of World War II, only three ships were permanently assigned to the
region. By 1946, however, great power conflict compelled Navy planners to view the eastern
Mediterranean as a theater for an offensive against the Soviets.20 At the height of the Cold War,
this strategy led to a standing force numbering between 40 and 70 American ships—the famous
Sixth Fleet.21
Despite significant surges in deployment as a result of the 1991 and 2003 wars in Kuwait and
Iraq, the overall size of the Sixth Fleet has shrunk considerably since the close of the Cold
War. Similar levels of retrenchment can be seen among allied naval contingents in the region.
Although NATO remains the basis for many cooperative efforts, recent crises—such as the 2011
war in Libya —have led to debates over the priorities and effectiveness of NATO in the region.
In the midst of this significant cutback in American forces in the Mediterranean, the politics
of the Middle East and North Africa have fundamentally changed. Many states in this region are
politically weaker than at any point since the start of the 20th century. A series of localized crises,
including the Iraq War of 2003 and the revolts encompassing the Arab Spring, have produced a
number of governments incapable of fully maintaining domestic order, let alone contributing to
regional stability.
The most profound of these threats is ISIS. Since rising to prominence in 2014, ISIS has done
more than threaten the domestic security of the United States and its allies through acts of terror-
ism. In seizing large swaths of land spanning the Levant and Mesopotamia, it has undermined
the legitimacy of the borders and governments spanning the Middle East. If left unchecked, the
precedents set by the Islamic State may lead to far more destructive conflicts in the future. Given
the weakening or even collapse of these regional states, the U.S. Navy is increasingly important in
supporting land commanders prosecuting the fight against ISIS. Flexible deployment postures
and sustained presence is a hallmark of the U.S. Navy. Regional political re-alignments may be
throwing standing assumptions about basing rights and land access routes into question, thus the
importance of the U.S. Navy’s ability to operate independently and to sustain the joint force from
the sea creates important national capability.
The U.S. Navy is also critical in managing the social and humanitarian fallout of the Islamic
State’s rise—fallout that has had far-reaching consequences for European and Western security
and stability. The dangers posed by ISIS have served to amplify other challenges confronting U.S.
naval forces operating in the Mediterranean region. The outbreak of conflicts across the wider
Mediterranean rim has led to a refugee crisis not seen since the end of the Second World War.
Attempts to mitigate the outflow and suffering of displaced persons fleeing across the sea
have had an adverse impact upon the United States and its allies. In addition to tasking sizable
contingents of personnel, aircraft, and ships to monitor the outflow of refugees, this humanitarian
crisis has affected the security of states in and beyond the immediate region. The establishment
of pro-ISIS factions in Libya and the Sinai Peninsula demonstrates the ability of terrorist groups
to use refugee flows as a means of exporting their campaigns abroad. Apprehension regarding the
spread of the ISIS “refugee threat” is especially felt within northern Europe in light of recent
attacks in Paris and Brussels. The rise of far-right nationalist movements in Europe can be traced
in part to the fear of immigration from the war-torn Middle East.
While the U.S. retains its significant advantage in technology and overall capacity, American
naval forces now contend with multiple regional powers operating within the Mediterranean Sea.
The increased presence of Russian naval forces along the Levantine coast currently stands as the
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most glaring example of this shift within the contemporary operational environment. Moscow’s
decision to ally itself with the regime of Bashar al-Assad has provided further incentive for the
buildup of Russian naval forces in the Mediterranean. While some security experts have suggested
that Russia’s fleet may be not be able to sustain such efforts in the long term, the participation of
Russian ships in the Syrian conflict creates limits and risks for American naval forces engaged in
the fight against the Islamic State.
The Navy’s current and future commitments in the Mediterranean Sea assume even greater
significance when considering the future integrity and capability of NATO. While the alliance
currently shows no outward sign of dissolution, recent events and trends have raised questions
about the organization’s collective strength. To date, most members have not upheld their alliance
commitments in defense spending. Some NATO members, such the United Kingdom and Spain,
have voiced concern over the alliance’s direct participation in anti-ISIS operations. Perhaps the
most worrying sources of concern have come from Turkey. Although the United States and other
allies continue to use Incirlik air base in the air campaign against ISIS, recent provocative
statements and acts by the Turkish government (such as Incirlik’s brief closure after the aborted
coup in July 2016 and Turkey’s subsequent purge of “pro-Western” elements of its military) raise
doubts among some observers about the ability of foreign forces to use Turkish installations in
the future. The absence of a viable alternative to Incirlik adds greater importance to the role of
U.S. carriers in the Mediterranean in maintaining American strike capabilities in support of land
forces fighting against the threat posed by the Islamic State.
China’s strategic challenge
The dramatic development and expansive growth of the Chinese economy since 1978 has enabled a
shift in military power rarely seen in international politics. Sustained double-digit growth in its mili-
tary budget from the early 1990s until recent years has created a vastly more capable People’s
Liberation Army (PLA), as well as its naval and air forces. China’s strategic interests in its own adjoin-
ing seas involve territorial disputes and a desire for a strategic buffer in the maritime sphere. China’s
involvement in global affairs has deepened, creating new interests further afield for its military.
Unresolved territorial conflicts at sea mar relations between China and seven of its neighbors.
The prospect for conflict between China and U.S. treaty allies Japan and the Philippines is real,
as it is with Taiwan, an important U.S. partner. Other partners such as Malaysia, Vietnam, and
Indonesia have less intense potential for conflict, but cannot be neglected. In all these cases, U.S.
Navy forces, supported by elements of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army, would be the center-
piece of the defense of territory and global commons were China to mount a challenge.
Additionally, as China’s involvement in global affairs has changed, so too has its strategic
interests. Recent strategic pronouncements from Chinese leaders have highlighted these changes
under the phrasing of the military’s “new historic missions” that require some degree of power
projection capabilities that will enable China to defend relatively new overseas interests.22 Again,
these interests will drive Chinese naval forces to grow and to become more proactive, and will
thus shape capabilities relevant to the U.S. Navy.
One of China’s major military advantages is in land-based missiles, which it possesses in large
numbers and diverse types. Increasingly accurate, these missiles pose major risks to fixed bases of
any potential adversary. A thick network of ISR capabilities on land, on reefs and islands in the
South China Sea, and in the air and in outer space give China good operational awareness within
hundreds of miles of its shore. This puts a premium on the inherent mobility of military forces
possessed by the U.S. Navy and the stealth of its submarines.
China’s navy and other forces that could target an adversary’s surface assets have also been
given priority in China’s military modernization. In contrast to the coastal defense force that
Beijing fielded only a few decades ago, today China regularly engages in regional patrols with
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nascent blue water surface action groups with a mix of capable air defense destroyers, frigates,
and support vessels. A growing fleet of conventional and air independent propulsion-equipped
diesel attack submarines provide additional potent capabilities. Maritime strike capabilities exist
in the Strategic Rocket Force in the form of anti-ship ballistic missiles and in land-based
maritime strike aircraft. These weapons all have the potential to complicate the U.S. Navy’s
deployments in the region.23
Conflicting (and still evolving) interests between Washington and Beijing create many
challenges for the United States—challenges that the U.S. Navy is well suited to address.24 There
are several militarily capable allies in the region, with Japan and South Korea among the most
advanced in the world. But these allies need reassurance from the United States, and as U.S. naval
and air forces are most relevant in facing potential challenges from China, the Navy will be called
on to continue to make its presence felt in the region. Indeed, there has been progress in
overcoming historical grievances between those two allies, progress that has been facilitated
through trilateral naval exercises. Deepening that cooperation provides valuable complementary
capabilities, particularly in areas such as ASW and theater missile defense, for the U.S. Navy.
Still, neither country has substantial strike and power projection capabilities, an area where the
United States provides complementary capabilities to the allied force. One of the vital roles for
the U.S. Navy will be in bolstering similar such coalitions and regional security architectures in
ways that help shape China’s continued rise.
The U.S. Navy needs to develop capabilities tailored to, and sized for, these tasks. China
possesses the home court advantage: in any of the most likely conflicts (over Taiwan, the South
China Sea, or the Senkakus), China would be able to depend on land-based capabilities. These
can be dispersed throughout nearby areas of continental China, creating a “cruise missile sponge”
for U.S. strike assets, and raising the potential for strategic escalation. China also benefits from
primarily local security interests; its global interests are nascent and not large stressors on its
military forces. By contrast, the United States has vital interests within range of China’s missiles
and other land-based strike assets. Indeed, treaty allies and other close partners’ homelands fall
within the range of many such systems. This creates serious demand on the diffuse, mobile, and
stealthy/silent forces that only the Navy can provide.
China, like Russia, also has proven adept at manipulating “grey zone” coercive diplomacy,
staying just below the threshold for significant use of conventional forces while achieving coercive
outcomes. Nominally “civilian” vessels, a range of coast guard-like forces, and state-owned
commercial actors all coordinate, with the PLA Navy just over the horizon, to achieve expansive
aims. Contesting this requires both close coordination with regional maritime forces and numer-
ous smaller hulls to sustain a diffuse presence in the region. This puts a premium on naval forces.
More green water forces, increased numbers of frigates and potentially corvettes, Joint High
Speed Vessels and unmanned systems, and more forward presence from the U.S. Coast Guard
can all contribute. Additionally, small army, marine and SOF units that can be deployed to small
islands to enhance ISR and provide some land-based strike capabilities are valuable tools to deter
and potentially counter such expansion. All create additional demands on the U.S. naval forces.
Conclusion
The evolving geopolitical environment speaks to the enduring imperatives of U.S. maritime
power. The U.S. Navy has long been the backbone of U.S. global influence and leadership, and as
much as new technology may alter the face of war to come, geography and its maritime aspect
remain unchanging. Ageless therefore is the necessity for this nation to project significant power
in maritime forces throughout the world’s oceans.
Four truths of sea power are manifest here. First, the U.S. Navy must preserve its ability to
apply American power in the littoral waters of the leading theaters of geopolitical conflict to deter
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adversaries during crises, and, if necessary, as an element of the joint force, defeat them in a war.
Second, the U.S. Navy must organize itself around sensible strategic concepts that complement
the joint force, provide for the security of the nation, its interests, and its allies, and that accord
with the needs and ends of policy as a whole in its domestic and external aspects.25 Absent sound
strategic principles, the Navy may fall victim to conflicting goals and organizational decline,
which has happened frequently in the past and must not be allowed to happen now on the cusp
of a much-needed regeneration of U.S. sea power. The Navy must do all it can within the
American government and before America’s citizens to argue this case, one which is ignored or
simply taken for granted by too many at great peril until it is too late. Third, in light of the
changing international security environment, naval forces have become more important to
enabling the entire joint force. Greater awareness within the defense community of the growing
relative importance of modern maritime capabilities to supporting army and air force
commanded campaigns is needed. Finally, the Navy must organize itself in its fighting line and in
all the subsidiary structures to support this strategic concept.
These three truths of sea power form the basis for sound strategy at sea and must be kept con-
stantly in the forefront of the present debate about the size, shape, and composition of the Navy’s
force structure. The challenge for strategists today, as in previous eras, is to determine how best to
anticipate the changing global strategic landscape so that American naval strategy, and the slower
to change Navy force structure, can remain connected with emerging threats and national strategy.
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